Drawing from both fictional and non-fictional sources, this article traces the way history was conceptualised in twentieth century Ethiopia by secular educated elites, charting out the changing power relations between Ethiopia's hegemonic historiographical paradigm, and the alternative historical visions that challenged this ‗Great Tradition' over the course of the century. While the Great Tradition extols Ethiopia's past and future glories, the counter-histories focused instead on the country's failure to develop and democratise. Against the interpretation that the counter-histories supplanted the Great Tradition in the late 1960s, the article examines them in terms of complementarity. The intellectual interventions of young student radicals in the late 1960s constitute a break, but not a drastic paradigm shift, from the past. The Great Tradition had already been put into question by older generations of intellectuals, even if they proved unable or unwilling to translate their disillusionment in political action.
The interpretation of the Ethiopian past has been largely dominated, from the nineteenth century to the present, by a specific historiographical framework, variably called the ‗Great tradition', ‗Grand tradition', ‗Ethiopianist tradition', ‗Ethiopianist nationalism', ‗Church and State tradition', Ethiopian students to be trained abroad. The generation of the ‗pioneers', born in the late nineteenth century and active before the Italian occupation, had high-profile ministerial and government jobs This article's focus on secular intellectual elites -government workers, academics, fiction writers, civil servants, journalists, theatre directors, and university students -is far from painting a comprehensive picture of intellectual production in the period considered here. More scholarly attention should be devoted to the contributions of non-elite intellectuals. Alongside this elitist bias,
Ethiopian intellectual history has also tended to overlook the work of religious scholars, and a comprehensive analysis of historical and political debates within religious institutions is still lacking.
It is nevertheless important to counteract the simplistic notion of the secular supplanting the religious in intellectual history -the notion, that is, that intellectual history in Ethiopia was shaped in religious institutions before the twentieth century, and that from the twentieth century the only intellectual history that counts is the one produced in secular or state environments. On the contrary, religious scholars continued to contribute to political and historical debates, as shown by Messay Kebede in his study on al a Asres Yenesew 6 . The contribution of religious scholars shows how history writing cannot be entirely subsumed under the banner of a -state ideological project‖, in Pietro Toggia's definition 7 . This holds true, to a certain degree, for the secular intellectual elites as well, whose relationship with state institutions, as we shall see, always retained an element of ambivalence. This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published by Cambridge University Press in The Journal of African History: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-african-history/all-issues Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24350/ 5 occasionally emerged to the surface of historical discourse. Yet, the middle generations' disillusionment represented an essential backdrop against which the ideas of young student radicals were articulated. In turn, ‗the intellectual culture and discourses that animated the Ethiopian student movement in the 1960s and 1970s have continued to impact political processes in the country in the generations since' 11 . The Great Tradition and the counter-historiographies proceeded parallel to one another during the course of the century, and both are alive and well even today.
THE GREAT TRADITION
The mythology that structured much of the historiographical claims of the Great Tradition between Christian centres and non-Christian peripheries 12 . This unicentric tendency to assimilate ‗all historical discourse into the worldview of the author or his protagonist, reserving little room for alternative voices' made the Great Tradition ‗highly monoglossic' 13 . Ethiopia's thousand-year monarchical saga is told as part of a transcendental time: that of God and Christianity. Historical actors are judged based on their moral standing in the polarity between good and evil, God and Satan, Christians and infidels. These roles and their significance derived from the all-encompassing religious-historical process that began with the events of the scriptures, continued through the early Church, culminate in the flourishing of the true faith in Ethiopia, and would continue to unfold as foretold in prophecy and described in eschatological literature. Individual agents -whether good or evil-were through their moral roles major and minor players in this universal history, much as they were in the Hebrew and Christian scriptures 16 .
Accompanying the teleological unfolding of such monarchy-centred and divinely-ordained history is a static and stable identity, whose contours are described in a normative and essentialist way. The institution of the monarchy is presented as both the moulder and the guarantor of this identity -a notion that remained at the core of the Great Tradition all the way up to the twentieth century.
THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
The beginning of the twentieth century was marked by profound changes in the configuration of Ethiopia as a polity. In the new international system resulting, Solomonic emperors came to rule a precisely-defined and contractually-demarcated territory, in accordance with newly-minted international legal concepts. The idea of Ethiopia became anchored for the first time to a fixed geographic space and acquired a clearly defined cartographical identity, with internationallyrecognised boundaries. The borders newly delineated in the 1890s and 1900s were located, as a result of Mənilək II's military campaigns of the 1880s and 1890s, much farther afield than the traditional This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published by Cambridge University Press in The necessity to ideologically situate Ethiopia in the rapidly-globalising international environment, an environment to which Ethiopian intellectuals were exposed in significantly higher numbers and to a drastically more extensive degree than in the past, gave a renewed prominence to debates about national identity. How to make sense of Ethiopia's new place in the international system of states and market economies? It was around the core components of the Great Tradition that a first set of debates concentrated: the function of the monarchy in the context of new normative ideas of statehood; the notion of national unity in the context of Ethiopia's multi-ethnic state; the role of religion as an instrument of political (and particularly monarchical) legitimation; the significance of Christianity as a founding principle of public morality and the law.
Another area of intellectual ferment revolved around models of world history. How should Ethiopian intellectuals appraise the imperial ideologies attached to the international system? Narratives of modernity and progress offered unifying and far-reaching explanations to global historical development. In historiography, this led to a revival of the teleological conception of history inspired by the Christian doctrine. At the level of state narrative, the Christian teleology was secularised into an equally teleological theory of modernisation that emphasised state-building, industrialisation and science. Progress -mostly conceived as military reforms, technological advancement, infrastructural development and institutional centralisation -became the self-proffered mission of the state.
These debates, with the new inputs coming from abroad, made the first decades of the twentieth century particularly creative from the point of view of history writing and political thought. This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published by Cambridge University Press in The Journal of African History: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-african-history/all-issues Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24350/ Ethiopia, whose monarch was tasked with preserving the country's age-old faith, was therefore to be counted among the world's developed and advanced nations. Gäbrä Krestos's teleology, De Lorenzi concludes, is far from Eurocentric in this.
In the attempt to hybridise local and foreign historiographical paradigms, two foundational aspects were reinstated that came to define the Great Tradition in the twentieth century. The first were moral codes, and the second were socio-political hierarchies. The two are closely interlinked, as the monarch was considered the main agent of progress, and progress was conceived on the basis of Christian eschatology. Class hierarchies were thought to be divinely ordained. The Emperor, leading society from the top, had a simultaneous secular and religious mandate. Western societies were found lacking for not having an ethical guarantor to lead them, and Ethiopian thinkers ‗questioned the adequacy of the West's ideology for the life of the nation without the moral quest and activism of a divine monarch.' 19 Historical progress was thus conceived as a ‗part of a transcendent kingly moral insight'.
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The intellectual creativity of the beginning of the twentieth century corresponded with a rather fluid political situation, with different contenders for power and some weighty alternative conceptions of the state, most notably the multireligious and multicultural vision of Ləjj Iyasu. By contrast, the centralisation of the political arena from the 1930s -when Ras Täfäri consolidated his power and the intellectual class became heavily dependent on his personal patronage -led to a progressive rigidification of both political thought and historiographical practice.
POST-1941
It is after 1941, at the height of Haylä Səlasse's power, that the Great Tradition acquired a fixed, distinctive and formulaic identity. When scholars today talk about the hegemony of the Great
Tradition in Ethiopian studies, they are really referring to a distinctive, but fairly loose tradition that This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published by Cambridge University Press in The Journal of African History: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-african-history/all-issues Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24350/ building failing? Had it failed already? Was it still possible for Ethiopia to achieve the modernisation that the Emperor had promised?
This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published by Cambridge University Press in

Within the Great Tradition, the victory at Adwa was thought to usher a future of progressive grandeur, comparable to those of ‗modern' European nations. However, as time went on, the more a distance grew between the expected glory of the country and the reality of its perceived underdevelopment. Ethiopia's ‗separate destiny' started to be seen as a burden rather than a privilege.
Adwa was thus cast as a broken promise, and the patriotism it kept inspiring became infused with a sense of unfulfillment. The belief, boosted by Adwa, in Ethiopian exceptionalism made it all the more disappointing for the intellectuals to look at Ethiopia's lack of progress. The promise of Adwa was from its beginning intertwined with a feeling of inexplicable and unmerited decadence. The fact that Täklä-Hawaryat expressed this view after the Italian occupation is significant. Although the histories of failure did not seem to have had a concrete impact on the country's political situation, the anxiety felt by the old guard was motivated by the same structural problems that angered the students. The difference between these two generations in the 1960s had more to do, perhaps, with socio-economic incentives. While the older thinkers had secure and well paid jobs in the government, civil service or state-sponsored cultural institutions, the students graduated when unemployment was on the rise. Ideologically speaking, though, there is a clear continuity between the two cohorts: both are part of a decades-old ideological trend that foregrounded ideas of failure and decline against the Great Tradition's rhetoric of chosenness and exceptionalism.
POST-1974
From the 1970s onwards, the two-way connection between historiography and political practice became much more explicit. Under the guise of Marxist discourse, the Därg regime effectively preserved the imperial conception of Greater Ethiopia as a national identity transcending regional and ethnic ‗particularism' 47 . The opposition to the Great Tradition, intuitively sketched out by the middle generations in their books and then openly championed by the students in the street, was now pursued by armed liberation movements on the battlefield. The connections between student organizations and rebel groups, in terms of leaders and ideas, were sometimes conspicuous, to the point that Gebru Tareke At no time before the conquest by Menelik was the present day Ethiopia a single country.
What existed were independent polities. […] The official Ethiopian history that […] presents
Menelik's era as ‗the unification of Ethiopia' is a fabrication, pure and simple. As in the rest of colonial Africa, the Oromo and other southern peoples were subjugated, their peace, their cultural identities and human dignity deprived 50 .
How successful were these counter-historiographies in challenging the Great Tradition? Historians who promoted the national oppression thesis and the colonial thesis tended to legitimise their political claims using the same tools employed by the Great Tradition: antiquity, unity, authenticity. Reacting against ‗oppressive conditions and denials of identity' Oromo studies understandably emerged, after decades of marginalisation, as an ‗intrinsically ideological and emotionally-bound' scholarly field The rulers' attitude towards historiography, though, remained pragmatic and goal-oriented, so that when a number of political developments made it convenient to resurrect the Great Tradition's symbolism, EPRDF party leaders did not hesitate to skilfully do so. In 1996, during the celebrations for the one hundredth anniversary of the battle of Adwa, the government sought to emphasise how the Tigrayans were the main agents behind the victory. But then, during the 1998-2000 war with Eritrea, the memory of the battle was then refashioned as a symbol of Pan-Ethiopian resistance against foreign invaders -be they Italians, it was suggested, or their Eritrean successors.
Imperial iconography and ancient monarchical myths were further revived, as argued by In contemporary Ethiopian studies, it is generally assumed that it was the Ethiopian Student
Movement that coined these counter-hegemonic visions of history. Although the student generation marked a significant change in Ethiopian intellectual history, overstressing the idea of a radical break with the past overshadows the elements of similarity between the students and their seniors.
Intergenerational ideological relations within the secular intellectual elite in the 1960s and 1970s are better understood by looking at long-term continuities rather than assuming abrupt ruptures.
The old generations, particularly those born in the 1930s and active in the 1960s, had already articulated ideas of national decline and historical failure. Many attacked their peers for their inability or unwillingness to commit to social change. Although profoundly disillusioned with the country's state of affairs, they proved reluctant to dismiss the Great Tradition altogether, and held onto it against the ever-growing empirical evidence that the destiny of glory it anticipated for Ethiopia had failed to materialise. The Great Tradition was perceived to have such a reassuring and time-tested explanatory power that no alternative ideological options were believed to be as viable. At the same time, this ideological impotence caused, by the old intellectuals' own admission, an acute sense of apprehension and anxiety. In stark contrast with their elders, the students took to the streets, mobilised collectively, and increasingly embraced an ideology, Marxism, that up to that moment had not had any traction in Ethiopian political thought. Despite choosing profoundly different ideological and practical responses, the two generational cohorts agreed on the same diagnosis of national stagnation.
Among the secular elites, the Great Tradition has always been the most politically and symbolically powerful version of Ethiopian nationalism, but it was never all-powerful. For the intellectuals under analysis, the belief in progress was always intertwined with a fear of failure. The contrast between the Great Tradition's exceptionalist claims and the country's lacklustre reality were at the basis of a widespread historiographical anxiety, but were also, and at the same time, the source of the intellectuals' historical creativity and social engagement.
The Great Tradition and the contrasting visions of a ‗failed' or ‗failing' national history proceeded side by side during the course of the twentieth century. In such parallel journey, they shared some basic premises: an essentialist and transhistorical view of identity, constructed in binary opposition to a radically antithetical cultural ‗other'. Both claimed legitimacy by appealing to antiquity, authenticity and unity. For Crummey, this means that the counter-historiographies remain ‗derivative, however hostile' 67 . At the level of state elites, the power relation between the two changed over time; the virtually uncontested hegemony of the Great Tradition was gradually eroded in the second half of the century. But more than deriving from one another, excluding one another, or overpowering one another, the Great Tradition and the counter-histories are ultimately to be conceived, as I have argued, in terms of a long-standing ‗complimentarity'
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